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Abstract
Contemporary collective action, much of which involves social media and other
Internet-based platforms, leaves a digital imprint which may be harvested to
better understand the dynamics of mobilization. Petition signing is an example of
collective action which has gained in popularity with rising use of social media
and provides such data for the whole population of petition signatories for a given
platform. This paper tracks the growth curves of all 20,000 petitions to the UK
government over 18 months, analyzing the rate of growth and outreach
mechanism. Previous research has suggested the importance of the first day to
the ultimate success of a petition, but has not examined early growth within that
day, made possible here through hourly resolution in the data. The analysis shows
that the vast majority of petitions do not achieve any measure of success; over 99
percent fail to get the 10,000 signatures required for an official response and only
0.1 percent attain the 100,000 required for a parliamentary debate. We analyze
the data through a multiplicative process model framework to explain the
heterogeneous growth of signatures at the population level. We define and
measure an average outreach factor for petitions and show that it decays very
fast (reducing to 0.1% after 10 hours). After 24 hours, a petition’s fate is
virtually set. The findings seem to challenge conventional analyses of collective
action from economics and political science, where the production function has
been assumed to follow an S-shaped curve.
Keywords: petitions; collective action; e-democracy; big data; popularity
dynamics; social contagion; multiplicative process
Introduction
Increasingly collective action takes place in whole or at least in part online [1], leav-
ing transactional data that allow for new forms of analysis. Studying the dynamics
of protest recruitment through social media [2, 3, 4], modeling emergence and res-
olution of conflict in online mass collaboration projects [5, 6], characterizing online
partisans [7], and quantifying “collective emotions” [8] are some examples of the
research based on these new type of data, which have been called “big data” in the
literature.
Petition-signing provides an example of a popular, low-cost act of political par-
ticipation that is increasingly carried out digitally and shared via social media [9].
In this paper, we analyze growth patterns in petitions submitted to the UK Gov-
ernment on the central government portal. This electronic petition platform was
developed by the UK Cabinet Office for the Coalition Government in 2010 and
launched in August 2011 at http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk.
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The petition platform replaced an earlier government platform on the No. 10
Downing Street website, which was the first online petition platform operated by
the UK government. The previous platform ran from November 2006 until March
2011, during which time the site received more than 12 million signatures associated
with over 5 million unique email addresses [10]. Both the No. 10 site and the newer
Cabinet Office site have allowed anyone to view petitions and any user with a valid
email address and UK postcode to create a new petition or to sign an existing
petition. There are important differences between the sites, however. Whereas the
first site showed the names of the 500 most recent signatories to a petition, the
new site shows only the name of the petition creator (see Figure 1). The sites also
have provided alternative measures for the “success” of a petition. For the earlier,
No. 10 site, the government guaranteed an official response to all petitions receiving
at least 500 signatures, while for the new site the coalition government promises an
official response at 10,000 signatures and that any petition attracting more than
100,000 signatures will qualify for a parliamentary debate on the issue raised.
Figure 1 A snapshot of a petition on the http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk site.
In this paper we focus on the second petition website. In previous work [11] we
analyzed data from the first website, finding that the number of signatures a petition
received on its first day was pivotal to its ultimate success. The low threshold for
success (500 signatures) and the coarse daily resolution of data on growth for the
earlier site did not allow for an in-depth examination of the critical early moments
of petitions. In this paper, we undertake a new in-depth investigation of the early
growth of petitions aided by the higher threshold for success on the new platform
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(100,000 vs 500 signatures) and a finer-grained capture of petition growth (hourly
vs. daily resolution). Analysis of this second platform also allows us to compare its
dynamics with those of the earlier platform, which we do throughout our analysis
where possible, to find properties of petition growth that transcend any specific web
platform
Background
Signing petitions has long been among the more popular political activities, leading
the field for participatory acts outside of voting [12]. In addition to the potential to
bring about policy change, petition signing has had other social benefits ascribed to
it such as reinforcing civic mindedness [13]. Online petitioning is one of a growing
portfolio of Internet-based democratic innovations [14], and the widespread use of
electronic petition platforms by both governments and NGOs (e.g., Avaaz and 38
Degrees) has received accolades for their democratic contribution [15, 16].
The UK petition platforms have received little attention in recent political science
research, with the exception of qualitative work by Wright [10, 17]. The German
e-petition platforms have been analyzed more extensively [18, 19]. Jungherr and
Ju¨rgens [19] examined the distribution of signatures to the top petitions and found
that while some successful petitions had an early number of signatures others re-
ceived the bulk of their signatures later. Schmidt and Johnsen combined qualitative
and quantitative methods to provide a typology for the petitions based on their
dynamics [20].
Online petitions are examples of mobilizations with strong online imprints, which
will include the entire transaction history for both successful and unsuccessful mo-
bilizations. The data that can be harvested from the signing of electronic petitions
represent a transactional audit trail of what people actually did (as opposed to what
people think they did) and an entire population (without the need to take a rep-
resentative sample). Data like this represents a shift for social science research into
political behavior, which has traditionally rested on survey data, or, for elections,
voting data. These data make it possible to look at the different patterns of growth
in the 20,000 mobilization curves that we have and identify the distinctive char-
acteristics of those mobilizations that succeed and those that fail with our digital
hindsight. Such studies, using data that has rarely been available to political science
researchers before the current decade, may tell us something about the nature of
collective action itself in a digital world. Of the research noted above, Jungherr and
Ju¨rgens used a smaller dataset to illustrate the viability of a big data approach
(or computational social science) [19], but other studies used surveys [18] or more
qualitative approaches [10].
Data
The UK Government’s petition website was accessed hourly from 5 August 2011
to 22 February 2013 with an automated script. Every hour, the number of total
signatures to date for each active petition was recorded. In addition, whenever a
new petition appeared, the title of the petition, the name of the petitioner, the text
of the petition, the launch date of the petition, and the government department
at which the petition was directed were recorded. Overall, 19,789 unique petitions
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were tracked, representing all active petitions available publicly at any point during
the study.
Results
Overall statistics
A total of 7,303,019 signatures were collected for the 19,789 petitions. Figure 2
shows that the distribution of these signatures is highly skewed, by plotting the
total number of signatures for each petition against the rank order of the petition
by total number of signatures. It is clear that a small number of petitions have been
signed many times each, while a large number of petitions have only been signed a
few times each (indeed, half the petitions received only one signature).
Only 5 percent of petitions obtained 500 signatures in total, which is similar to
the percentage achieving 500 signatures on the previous, No. 10 petition site [11].
Beyond this, 4 percent of the petitions received 1,000 signatures. Only 0.7 percent
attained the 10,000 signatures required for receiving an official response, and 0.1
percent attained the 100,000 signatures required for a parliamentary debate.
Despite the much larger threshold for success compared to the previous No. 10
platform (10,000 vs 500 signatures for an official response and the additional mea-
sure of success of 100,000 signatures for a parliamentary debate), a similar pattern
in growth emerges suggesting that the first day was crucial to achieving any kind
of success. Any petition receiving 100,000 signatures after three months, needed to
have obtained 3,000 signatures within the first 10 hours on average. The external
measure of 100,000 signatures as success is also clear in Figure 2: petitions rarely
grow further once passing the 100,000 signature mark.
Figure 2 Total number of signatures per petitions plotted against the rank order of the
petition based on its total number of signatures.
Outreach and growth
Figure 3 shows the number of signatures over time (hours passed from each petition’s
launch time). The lines are shaded according to the final number of signatures each
petition collected. From this figure it can be easily observed that even those petitions
with large number of signatures, collected them very shortly after the launch and
generally after a few days the growth slows significantly for all petitions (note the
logarithmic scale of the y-axis).
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Figure 3 Growth of the number of signatures for all petitions. Lines are shaded according to
the total number of signatures on the petition at the end of the collection period.
At first glance these findings seem to contradict the normal assumptions of
economists and sociologists, who have assumed the production function for col-
lective action to follow an S-shaped curve, with the shape dependent upon the
distribution of thresholds in the population [21, 22, 23, 24]. Rather than a slow ac-
cumulation of supporters building up to critical mass, at which point support “tips
over” into success, petitions that have been successful in receiving large number of
signatures demonstrate very rapid early growth, which decelerates overtime. The
exponential growth of the number of signatures within the first few hours would
suggest even a finer zoom into the data would not capture any build-up period.
We attempt to capture the characteristic of early rapid growth and decay that
the data reveal, with a model of “collective attention” decay, drawing on Wu and
Huberman [25]. In their model, they calculate a “novelty” parameter relating to
the novelty of news items on Digg (http://digg.com), a news sharing platform,
that decays over time. In a more general framework, the decay in attention could
occur for different reasons, for example reaching the system size limit, or lack of
viral spread.
In the model, N agents at the time t, bring Nµ new agents in the next step on
average, µ being a multiplication factor. In our case, this would mean that every
signature on petition i brings µi new signatures in the next hour, leading to an
exponential growth of rate µi in the number of signatures. This model fits the
data we observe empirically quite well for the short period of time directly after
a petition’s launch (see Figure 3). Very soon, however, the rate decays and new
signatures come at a much lower rate.
As in the model of Wu and Huberman [25], we introduce a decay factor to capture
this decrease. Specifically, we let the multiplication factor decay by introducing a
second factor r(t), which decays in a way that is intrinsic to the medium: each
signature at time t, on average brings µir(t) new signatures in the next hour. This
“outreach parameter” can change overtime and dampen the fast initial growth, cor-
recting for the early saturation observed in the empirical data. The growth equation
then reads:
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Ni(t+ 1) = Ni(t)(1 + µir(t)) (1)
The number of signatures at time t then can be written as:
Ni(t) = Ni(0)(1 + µir(0))(1 + µir(1)) . . . (1 + µir(t− 1)) (2)
In the limit of small time increments, Equation 2 converts to:
Ni(t) = Ni(0)e
(µi
∑t′=t
t′=0(r(t
′)) (3)
We can assume that the number of signatures at the beginning is one (the initiator
of the petition), and therefore averaging of the logarithm of both sides of Equation 3
leads to:
E[log(Ni(t))] = E[µi]
t′=t∑
t′=0
(r(t′)), (4)
where E[.] indicates the average over the whole sample.
In this framework, each petition has its own fitness and therefore an individual
growth rate of µi, whereas r characterizes the overall outreach power of the plat-
form as a whole. The outreach of the platform is assumed to be independent of
the petition fitness and popularity. The disentanglement between these two factors
enables us to calculate the outreach factor of the system by considering the whole
sample of petitions and averaging over the logarithm of the number of signatures
in hourly bins, starting from the time a petition is launched and then calculated
in hourly increment at time t and normalized by the logarithm of the number of
signatures up to time t as follows:
r(t) =
E[log(Ni(t))]− E[log(Ni(t− 1))]
E[log(Ni(t)]
. (5)
We have calculated the outreach factor as a function of time according to Equa-
tion 5 and illustrated it in Figure 4. The outreach factor decays very fast and, after
a time span of 10 hours, reduces to 0.1%.
The model holds, however, only when the growth rates of different petitions come
from a localized distribution with finite average and variance. To check this condi-
tion, we calculate the ratio between the sample average and variance of log(N(t))
for different t and check the following linear relation holds:
E[log(N(t))]
Var[log(N(t))]
=
E[µi]
∑t′=t
t′=0(r(t
′))
Var[µi]
∑t′=t
t′=0(r(t
′))
=
µ
σ2
, (6)
where µ and σ are the sample average and the standard deviation of the individual
growth rates. If the multiplicative model and the framework are valid, the ratio
between the sample mean and the variance of log(N) should remain constant over
time. Figure 5 plots these two values and demonstrates the ratio does indeed remain
constant. The root mean square of residuals from a diagonal line is 0.03.
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Figure 4 The outreach factor for the petition site as a whole calculated according to
Equation 5. The inset shows the same quantity on a log-log scale.
Figure 5 The sample average of log(N) against the variance of the same quantity to validate
the multiplicative model according to Equation 6. The solid line is a linear fit of the form of
y = ax with a = 1.872± 0.03.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper analyzes growth patterns in petitions created on the UK government
petitions platform for 18 months from August 2011 to February 2013. We find
that most petitions started on the platform failed to achieve any real traction,
while the minority of petitions that did amass a large number signatures did so
quickly. The distribution of the number of signatures per petition is highly skewed:
a few petitions captured a large number of signatures, while most petitions received
very few signatures. By applying a simple multiplicative growth model, we have
illustrated that the intrinsic time scale of the platform is very short and the growth
of signatures on petitions exhibits rapid dynamics.
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These findings have immediate application to petition platform designers as well
as to petitioners themselves. Although the UK site defaults to having petitions ac-
tive for one year, our analysis indicates that most signatures are added shortly after
a petition is launched. Shorter deadlines such as the three/six week deadlines of Ger-
man petitions [19] or the one month deadline of US petitions on the WeThePeople
site, therefore, might produce similar outcomes without the clutter of old petitions
on the sites. We are examining this design option through a comparison with the
US and German petitions platforms, and advising policy-makers regarding the opti-
mal design[1]. The analysis also highlights the importance for petitioners of gaining
early traction. Experimental research shows that the willingness of individuals to
sign a petition varies with the social information provided on how many other in-
dividuals have signed the petition already [26, 27]. The early growth of petitions
reflects a similar feedback loop as the petitions with the most signatures get further
signatures. The outreach factor, however, decays very quickly indicating that the
window of opportunity for success is very small on the platform.
The outreach factor is fit to all the data on the platform and reflects the collective
decay in attention to the platform as a whole. In comparison to the work by Wu and
Huberman [25] on the Digg news sharing website, where the outreach factor (there
called novelty) decayed “faster than power law,” with a half-life of approximately
one hour, the petition outreach factor decays very close to a power law.
Thus, attention to petitions lasts somewhat longer than attention to the news links
analyzed by Wu and Huberman [25]. It will be useful in future research to compare
the outreach of various platforms, political and non-political, to understand the
variations in the dynamics of different platforms. The growth patterns revealed
by this analysis challenge our current understanding of collective action in online
environments.
The explanation for the different patterns observed here may derive from the
means by which petition signatories come to find out about petitions. Analytics
data for the petition platform show the importance of social networking sites in
disseminating petitions: about 50% of users arrive at the petitions platform via
either Facebook or Twitter, which also have a very high intrinsic pace [28].
Intuitively, we would expect dissemination via social networking sites to encourage
early bursts, because if a user does not receive the information about a petition in
their Facebook feed or Twitter stream when it is first sent and appears there, they
will not do so unless they seek it out, which evidence from previous research suggests
most users do not [29, 30].
Other investigations into the role of social networking sites in the growth of mo-
bilizations have identified an S-shaped curve, with critical mass reached only after
“mid” participants have responded to evidence of the contribution of early par-
ticipants [2]. Such accounts follow conventional frameworks of collective action in
assuming that people have heterogeneous thresholds for joining a mobilization and
that until participation reaches the threshold of the majority of potential partic-
ipants, the joining rate will be slow [31, 22]. In contrast, we find no slow early
growth in those mobilizations that were successful, but rather a very rapid growth
[1]http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/
procedure-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/e-petitions
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such that even with the hourly resolution of data collection, we do not observe any
initial slow growth phase.
In the context of petitions, it seems that becoming aware of a petition is more
important to eventual success (analogous to sharing news, as in Wu and Huber-
man [25]) than influence from the originator of the petition or the identity of those
who have shared it on social networking platforms (as in, for example, [2]). Signing
a petition is a very low cost activity (especially when the name of the signer is not
publicly displayed). As such there are many individuals with low enough thresholds
to sign, and the main challenge to a petition organizer is reaching these individuals
in the crucial time window to be successful.
Although we do not find evidence of the S-shaped curve identified by Gonzalez-
Bailon et al. [2], our pattern of early growth could be commensurate with the finding
of others that social contagion (where social contagion refers to dissemination)
requires exposure to a diversity of sources [32], and that evidence of recruitment
bursts would suggest that the effect of multiple and diverse exposures are magnified
if they take place in a short time window [2]. These observations suggest that S-
shaped commutative growth might not be a proper model to describe Internet-based
collective behavior where the costs of participation are very low and the pool of
potential participants is very large. Instead, an initial momentum that decays over
time seems to be a more relevant picture for online mobilization. Further research
would be needed to investigate this hypothesis, examining the spread of petitions
through social networking sites to understand variations in the dynamics of different
platforms.
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